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~ '--j Deregulation In the Nigerian Banking Industry:•
A Review and Appraisal
Dr. M. 0. Ojo ••
The objective ofthe paper is to review and ~praise the process ofderegulation in the Nigman Banlcing Industry
since the adoption ofthe S.tructuralAdjustmvit Programme in 1986. As a background, the paper analyses some
conceptual and theoretical issues and the regulatory framework before 1986. Deregulation of the banlcing
industry involves the systematic removal ofregulatory controls, structures and operationalguidelines which may
be considered inhibitive oforderly growth, competition and efficient allocation ofresources in the indusl,y. The
Nigerian banlcing industry experienced the most intensive regulations between 1958 and 1986. The regulawry
framework was supponed by major legislations such as the CBN Act of 1.958, Companies Act of1968 and the
BankingAct 1969, as well as the vigorous application ofthe Exchange Control Act of1962 While the regulations
ensured the viability and stability of the banlcing industry, they tended, through their prolonged~ to reduce
the competitiveness and efficiency ofthe industry. The basic elements of deregulation in the banking indusl,y
since 1989 have been the. liberalisation offoreign exchange transactions and fnternational trade generally, the
introduction of structural and institutional changes and some simplification of the monetary control process.
Along with a general improvement_ in financial intermediation, ,deregulation of the banlcing indusl,y has
encouraged savings mobiliZJJtion and increased flow of finandal resources to the productive sectors of the
economy. However, deregulation appears to have accentuated the problems of poor management, fraud,
inadequate infrastructure and scarcity ofprofessional staff With adequate long-range planning and maximum
co-operation with the monetary authorities, the banking industry is likely to experience stronger growth as the
process of deregulation gathers momentum

INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognised that the banking industry, by_ the nature of its activities, is among the
most heavily regulated sector in both developed and ~eveloping economies. As financial
intermediaries, banks assist in channelling funds from surplus economic units to deficit ones
to facilitate business transactions and economic development generally. Since these funds al"e
owned by third parties, prudence demands that such funds should be efficiently managed to
sµstain the confidence of depositors in the banking system, ensure the continued soundness
of the system itself and thereby minimize the risk of bank failures. Apart from this "prudential"
requirement, the authorities may want to intervene in the operations of the banking system to
correct the shortcomings of the price fixing mechanism in ensuring that what is comlfiercially
rational for an individual bank also approximates social rationality as much as possible. For
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example, in,terest rates charged by banks may be regulated to encouraged savings mobili7.ation
and· ensure adequate investments for rapid economic growth.· Similarly, the existence of
market imperfections and externalities in financial markets, especially in developing countries,
has often induced official intervention not only to boost investments, but also to redirect credit
to economic sectors with high social but low comme;cial rates of return.
Experience· has, however, shown that government intervention in the workings of any
mark~t may not often achieve the intended objectives efficiently. Indeed, such intervention
often results _in new economic distortions leading to a sub-optimal resource utili7.ation. In
order ·to rem~ or mi,Jirniu these distortions, policy makers have often resorted to economic
deregulation. Financial markets ate usually one of the first sectors of the economy to be
subjected to deregulation. The campajgn for deregulation of financial markets has been
vigorously undertaken in many developed economies. For instance, in the United States,
"Regulation Q" which had imposed interest rate ceilings on the deposits of Federal Reserve
member banks was abolished in 1983. In recent times, a number of third world countries with
heavy debt· burdens an~ dwindling foreign exchange earnings have also adopted policies
designed to·deregulate their economies, particularly the fioancial markets. This has usually
as part of comprehe~ structural adjustment programmes aimed at
been carried
enauring that market forces are assigned greater roles in the allocation of scarce resources.
Adopting the same philosophy, Nigeria, as part of its Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP}, has commenced the deregulation of its financial system. The proce,ss started most
earnestly with the h"berali2:ation of interest rates and banking structure; At present, the
monetary authorities seek to ~er deregulate the sector by moving away &om direct to
indirect control of mon:ey and credit, involving the manipulation·of market-based instruments.
Economic deregulation is a delicate exercise which, if not carefully undertaken, may destabilise the financial system and lead to a new set of distortions in the economy.
The ol>j~ of this paper is to review and appraise the process of deregulation so far in
the Nigerian banking industry against the background of the numerous. controls which
charactemed the industry before the SAP was adopted in 1986. The paper is divided into four
parts. Part J examines the conceptual and theoretical background to the policy of regulation
and deregulation in the banking ·industry, while Part D reviews the regulatory regime of the
N"igerian banking system &om its inception. Part m reviews and appraisq the process of
deregulation, highlighting the nature, effects-and problems of the reforms so far carried out.
The final Part cootains the summary and concluding remarks.including an ~ of the
challenges of deregulation in the banking industry.
PARTI
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

out

Economic regulation in general embraces all types of controls which government imposes
on economic and busin.ess activities. Economic regulation is a right claimed by all governments
in both free market and centrally planned economies. However, in a free market setting which
best describes our economic system, government regulatory. rale was traditionally most active in the area of public utilities. This first stage of regulation has qsually been followed by a wide
range of controls on both the domestic and external sectors, leaning heavily on some defined
economic philosophy but quite often having a political undertone. At tbe peak of regulation,
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government can be observed actually participating in some non-:traditional public sector
activities in efforts aimed at fostering coD1-petition and improving economic efficiency. When
regulation fails, as it often does, the process of deregula~n inevitably begins in a bid to avoid
a collapse of the whole system. Economic derr.p,lation in the present context J118Y be defined
as the deliberate and systematic removal of regulat_ory controls, structures aJJ.d operational
guidelines in the administration and pricing system in the economy. The un4erlying philosophy
of the deregulation of an economy or its component segments is the belief that factors of
production, goods and services are optimally priced and allocfted when their prices are freely
determined in a competitive environment. The symptom that often precipitates the need for
deregulation is the prevalence of supply/demand gaps in both the product and factor markets.
fn the financial markets, the gap ·manifests itself .in a savings(mvestment imbalance, tlie
prolonged existence of which is not conducive to long-term economic growth. The deregulation of the financial markets by eliminating distortions such as those emanating from subsidised interest rates and credit rationing will most likely improve economic efficiency and the
productivity of investments.
\
In the process of financial deregulation, market interest rates, -~use of their important
role in macroeconomic policy, assume a high level of significance. An interest rate policy has
a major influence not only on domestic expenditures, inflation and external payments, but also
on iong-term accumulation of savings and the level and composition of domestic investments.
The real domestic interest rates must be high enough to ensure an equihl>rium level of
savings/investment disequilibrium. Conversely, equih"brium in the domestic mark~t for savings
would occur at positive interest rates which ensure an increase in the supply of either domestic
or foreign savings, assuming such supply is interest-elastiCt to guarantee some reasonable level
of private sector investments. This analysis therefore suggests that the elimination of distortions in the market for financial savings would be expected to yield a significant gain in terms
of achievement of a higher rate of domestic private fixed capital formation and growth of
output that was hitherto practicable.
Extensive controls on interest rates and other elemerits of the financial mar~ts have been
motivated by a variety of factors, including the desire to infb,1ence the flow of credit to preferred
sectors of the economy and the concern that market-determined interest rates could result in
serious imperfections in the market. It has, for instance, Ileen argued that since domestic
financial markets are to some extent structurally oligopolistiq the freeing of int(?rest rate from
controls might lead to sharp increases in lending rates that wquld increase the cost of capital .
and thereby discourage investment. Moreover, such high nominal interest rates would also
increase the cost of servicing the public debt. While the above phenomenon has some
empirical foundation, especially in developing economies, controls have nevertheless often
induced high negative real rates of interest, resulting in the de~line of holdings of domestic
financial assets and the accentuation of the problem of capital flight. When such developments
occur, they usually severely restrict the availability of credit and thereby inhibit investment.
Since available credit is offer first allocated to large enterprises, credit for small and mediumsized firms may be severely limited, even though their investments could yield higher rates of
return.
'

.

4

CBN FINANCIAL & ECOl'-IOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 29, NO. 1

Thus, in order to increase the availability of credit, interest rate policy should be used to
encourage the accumulation of domestic financial assets by off~ring holders of these assets
sufficiently attractive rates. At the same time, other structuraVreforms could be used to
increase the efficiency of the financial system. Such reforms include the removal of regulations
impinging on the number of existing financial institutions and, where appropriate, support for
the broadening of the range of financial instruments. A well-developed and reasonably free
financial sector is, therefore, crucial both the mobilizing financial savings and for efficiently
channelling such savings into productiveI investments.
These are the considerations which
.
justify the deregulation of the financial system as a key element in most structural adjustment
programmed. It should be emphasised, however, that deregulation is not to be interpreted to
mean the absence of all regulations. Deregulation attempts to rationalise the existing
regulatory framework in such a way that efficiency and competition will be further promoted
for thegrowth of the industry and the economy as a whole.
,PART II
THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY
.
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the deregulation that has been embarked
upon in the banking industry in recent years, it would be expedient to review the regulatory
framework and performance of the iµdustry prior to the adoption. of SAP. This was the era
when the banking system was characterized by a series of regulations which'Yere rightly meant
to guarantee the survival of the system itself. It should, however, be noted that many of the
banking regulations of this period are still in force today.
A Perspective of Banking Regulations
The Nigerian banking scene before 1986 was characterised by changes designed to
promote banking in the country. The changes may be categorized into three phases: namely,
the era oflaissez-fair banking (1894-1952), era of limited banking regulations (1952-1958) and
the regime of intensivcuegulations (1958-1986). During the first phase, banking business was
monopolized by foreign/banks, principally-the African Banking Corporation which was the
precursor of the former Standard Bank and the present First Bank of Nigeria, the Colonial
. Bank which predated the former Barclays Bank and present-day Union Bank, and the British
and.French J3ank, the for-runner of the present United Bank for Africa. Alleged discrimination against Nigerians by these banks led to the establishment of some indigenous banks which
unfortunately offered little or no competition to the foreign banks essentially because of their
weak capital base and poor managerial capacity. Consequently, aU but three of the indigenous
banks failed.
The enactment of the. Nigerian Banking Ordinance in 1952 introduced some form of
regulations into the Nigerian banking scene. The ordinance laid down the standard and
procedure for the conduct of banking business by prescribing the-mandatory minimum capital
requirement for banks and introduced regulations to check bank failures. However, all the
indigenous banks established in the country during this period also all failed. The bank failures
of this era were attributed largely to the mon?polistic structure of the banking industry which
allowed the foreign banks to enjoy exclusive patronage from the British firms.
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The period 1958-1986, which may be aptly described as the regime of intensive banking
regulation, began with the enactment of the Central Bank of N'igeria Act of 1958 which gave
legal backing to th~ establishment of the Central Bank of N'igeria (CBN). This Act empowered·
the CBN to promote and integrate the Nigerian financial system. Thus, the CBN was able to
outline regulatory measures to effectively stem the tide of bank failures that followed the first
banking boom. Consequent upon this new and encouraging climate, more commercial banks
sprang up in the country. For instance, between 1959 and 1960, eight new commercial banks
were established, bringing the total number of commercial banks to 12 which increased further
to 17 by 1962. Under the 1968 Companies Act, foreign-based banks operating in N'igeria were
obliged to be incorporated in the country. During this period also, government acquired
contro~ shares in a number of foreign banks including the "Big Three" commerclal banks ·
namely, First Bank, Union Bank and United Bank for Africa. Two other sources of banking
regulations were the Banking Act of 1969 and the Exchange Control~ct of 196k The Banking
Act of 1969 generally provided for the regulation and control of the monetary and financial
system. Specifically, it made provisions for the granting of licenses to banks while imposing
restrictions on.the activities of licensed banks. The Act also made provision for the CBN to
exercise its powers in maintaining monetary and financial !itability in the economy, the
stipulation of liquidity and capital ad~uacy-requirements, certain catego~ of investments
banks cannot undertake, as well as lbjits on interest rates and bank lending to the private
sector. The Exchange Control Act o!J.962 was not auned at banks,'ffirectly, but sirice foreign
exchange transactions are mostly carried out through the banking system, the existing foreign
exchange regulations would necessarily restrict the actions of the banks. ~ 1962 Act,
whenever it was rigorously applied during periods of scarce foreign. exchange resources,
ensured that foreign excbang~ was allocated to the priority sectors of the economy.
Nature of Banking Regulation
Having outlined the sources of banking regulations, it is neceisary to examine their various
forms and-how they were applied prior to SAP. Three categories of banking regulations will
be considered- statutory regulations, Central Bank's guidelines and other regulations incidental to performing the functions of the CBN.
(a)

Statutory Regulations

The main statutory regulations are specificaUy stated in the banking laws• the'.Central Bank
Act (1958) and the Banking Act {1969). These laws stipulate the duties ofbanks and the penalty
for default. Some of the regulations specify the requirements for the maintenance for reserve
funds, disclosure of interest by directors and other bank officials, keeping books of accounts,
restriction on payment of dfyidends and other activities of the banks. These and other rules
are designed to protect all the interest groups in banking development-shareholders, management, workers, custome~ as well as the banking system and the economy generally. Tho rules,
while recognising the right of shareholders to earn their dividends, ensure that banks remain
viable and strong for the benefit of all parties. Other obj~ of the banking regulations are
to ensure that banks have honest and dedicated staff, keep books of accounts to enable them
render regular returns to the regulatory au{horities within the' prescribed time limit. The

6

CBN f1NANCIAL & ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 29, NO. I

regulations are designed also to give direction to the banks in the preparation and publication
of profit and loss accounts and balance sheets and the appointment and powers of auditors-all
of which are c;xpected to enhance sound banking practices and the~eby enable the banks to
cany out their major function of financial intermediation.
(b)

Central Bank Guidelines

In addition to the statutory regulations, the Central Bank is empowered to make other rules
which are to foster .monetary stability and a sound financial structure. These extra rules are
usually reflected in the regular Central Bank's guidelines to banks. In the period before SAP,
the important regulatory instruments were the stipulation of ~ reserve requirement and
liquidity ratio, the call-up of special deposits and issue of stabilization securities, as well as the
direct regulation of interest rates and growth and sectoral distn'bution of.bank credit.
Introduced in the 1976fTT fiscal year, the cash reserve ratio was designed to influence the
liquidity of banks and their ability to grant credit. In this regard, the CBN prescribed ratio
ranged between 2 and 5 per cent , only commercial banks were subject to this guideline. The
other variant of reserve requirement- liquidity ratio-was originally fixed at 25 per cent mainly
to safeguard the ability of ·banks to meet their depositors' cash withdrawals and ensure
confi(jence in the b ~ system. Sµbsequent legislative _amendments gave the Central Bank
the composition of the liquid assets for the compilation of the
not cinly the power to
liq~ratio but also to change the liquidity ratio itself, though it remained unchanged at 25.0
per cent during the pre-SAP period.
The CBN's ·power to call for special deposits from banks has been found to be a useful
supplement to cash and liquidity ratios. This instrument was used on a number of occasions
during the pre- SAP period. A related instrument -statiili7.ation securitie.s-which was introduced in 1976, was retired in 1979 and was not utili7.ed again ~ the 'pre-SAP era. Another important tool of control was the direct regulation of interest rates. Up to July 1987, interest
rates were determined administratively by fixing the ranges within which both the deposit and
lending rates were to be determined by banks. It is pertinent to· note that the most popular
tool of regulating the lending activities of b ~ prior to SAP (and even now) was the
specification of ceilings on their credit expansion and indication of sectoral allocation of the
-permissible quantum of credit.It may be observed that the banking regµlations emanating
from the CBN guidelines assist mainly in the process of monetary control which is essential
for econolJ!ic stability. In the main, the tools of direct monetary control are virtually inevitable
in und~~ped financial markets, while the general evidence-is_ that monetary-authorities.
usually face prQblems in their application.

alte~

(c)

Regulations Arising From Some CBN Functions

Apart from regulations-arising directly from the statutes dr the regular CBN guidelines,
other rules emanate from certain functions of the Central Bank. For example, as the bankers'
bank, the CBN decides the amount of overdraft it can allow each bank. ·It has also the
opportunity to advise the banks or to hold consultations with them. For example, the Bankers;
Committee meetings pt ovide opportunities for interactions with the banks. The Central Bank
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also uses it s supervision of the cheque clearing houses to monitor the activities of banks.
Besides, the Bank is involved in the selection of applications for banking licenses.
(d)

Monitoring And Enforcement

Having identified the sources and nature of banking regulations, it remains to examine how
the regulations are enforced. There are two major ways through which the CBN monitors the
activities of the licensed banlts in order to assess their compliance with the regulations. The
first is the appraisal of their statutory returns to the CBN. This enable the CBN to analyse
bank's per(ormance with a view to determining what new strategi~s tq adopt to enhance future
performance. Such analysis also helps the Bank to make recommendations to government on
policies affecting the banks. Apart from appraising the bank's statutory and other returns, the
CBN goes further to examine the books of the banks in order to ensure that they comply with
the regulations set for them in the statutes and the Central Bank guidelines. In the process of
supervising the affairs of the banks, defaults may be detected and are usually penalised. The
major penalties for default are fines, the confiscation of the equivalent of credit excesses or
shortfalls by the CBN and withdrawal of some privileges.
Appraisal of Banking Regulations
The effects of banking regulations in Nigeria prior to SAP could be descn"bed as mixed.
While some of the effects were salutary, others could be considered counter-productive.
Banking regulations -whether statutorily or discretionarily administered by the regulatory
authorities - had some salutary effects on the banks and their customers. They, nocdoubt,
positively influenced the viability of banks in N~ria. ~ fact is ~t appreciated if we
recollect the constant bank failures during the laissez- fair banking practices of the 1940's and
1950's. Between1951 and 1852, for example, about 17 new indigenous banks were established,
but only ·one of them survived beyond two years. The free-for-all banking ~ces of the
period, especially before the Banking Ordinance· of 1952, no doubt, encouraged the 'factors
which led to bank failures. The factors included · irfadequate capital and staff, structural
handicap imd poor management. Following the Ordinance and subsequent banking laws-the
Central Bank Act and the 1969 Banking Act, bank failures gradually disappeared from the
Nigerian scene. This will tend to corroborate the view that the protection of banks has been
the central aim of the regulations. Banking regulations, by promoting the viability of banks,
encouraged increased investment in the bankingindustry and consequent growtli in banks and
the services they rendered.
Despite the benefits just highlighted, a number of problems arose from the banking
regulations, especially in the period immediately befoJ~ SAP, and questioned the entire in.ode
of banking regulation. The main approach to banking regulation in the period SAP involved
the use of direct controls. The degree of compliance varied among the banks with some of the
banks making good effects at compliance. For some of the regulations, the banks bad no other
alternative than to comply. For example, when the CBN required b1mks to make special
deposits with it, they had no room to manoeuvre, especially if the special deposits could be
transfer.red from the banks' current accounts at the CBN. Besides, the Central Bank's controi
through the withdrawal of privileges or facilities, tended to ~nipcl comUfiance. J'.he major
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areas of default were the cases where the banks had room and incentive to manoeuvre. For
example, on the average, most banks defaulted on the ce~, imposed dn their credit.
expansion and the guidelines on the sectoral allocation of their credit. The rapid increase in ·
the number of banks since the 1970s increased the burden of monitoring individual banks and
therefore made enforcement or regulations more difficult. The banks exploited this loophole
by circumventing the controls, through window dressing and the use of off-balance sheet items
to hide relevant information about their operations, thereby increasing the difficulty of the
regulatory au~orities in getting appropriate information for enforcing the regulations. In an
attempt to get the growing number of banks to comply with the rules; the regulatory authorities
diverted more of its resources to the enforcement of COJilpliance with credit c e ~ and
related direct controls. Furthermore, the focus of pre-,SAP regulations on direct controls
resltlted in declining competition in the banking industry as each bank's market share became
st~ctly determined by credit ceilings an4 adtttlnistratively filled interest rates. Efficiency of the
system was reduced as banks were allowed the same proportional expansion in credit irrespective of the level of their efficiency. Above all, regulations gave too much room to fraudulent
and corrupt practices within the system.
PART III
THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION 1N
THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY
Measures of Deregulation
One could·safely say that the era of deregulation of the Nigerian banking system came with
SAP which h~ assigned a pivotal role to market factors in the pricing and allocatiqn of
resources for development. ~e measures of deregulation so far implemented in the banking
system cover such areas as interest rates, licensing of new banks, sectoral allocation of credit,
withdrawal of public sector deposits, and the use of an auction method in theissuing of treasury
securities.
Although the stance of monetary policy has remained generally tight since the adoption of
SAP in a bid to restrict aggregate demand and curtail inflationary pressures, there has
nevertheless, been a conscious move towards· ensuring a more market-oriented banking .
system. This has been predicated on the need .ht facilitate the mobilization of financial savings
and encourage a more efficient allocation of such resources. In a significant departure from
previous policies, the tight control over interest rates has since 1987 been removed to enable
banks charg~ market rates of interest and also pay competitive rates to their depositors. In
order to further boost savings mobilization, the spread between tleposit and lending rate was
narrowed further during the course of i986, followed in 1988 by the complete e~tion of
lending rate differentials among economic sectors. The classification of the economy into may
sector/sub-sectors for the purpose of allocation of bank credit which had let the banks with
little or no discretion in their credit operations has also been revised to ensure greater
flexibility for banks. The number of sectors was first reduced from eight in 1985 to four in 1986
and further to two in 1987, with agricul~ure and manufacturing (including tourism recently)
rated as high priority sectors, while all other sectors constitute the second category. There is
a plan to completely abrogate the entire classification when the system has acquired a built-in
feature that would not unduly discriminate against productive activities.
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Furthermore, in keeping with the policy of deregulation of the-economy in genel'al and the
banking sector in particular, government has continued to license more new banks, ·irrespective of pressures for restraint, provided proprietors of proposed new banks show evidence of·
ability to operate on profession~ basis. Consequently, the period s~ce SAP has witnessed an
upsurge in the number of new commercial and·merchant banks. For instance, between 1986
and 1990, a total of 46 new commercial and merchant banks opened for business, and about
25 others had been granted li~nses but were yet to start business. Thus, at the end of 1990,
the total number of banks was 106, while the number of bank branches/offices also increased
from 1,655 in 1985 to 2,025. In order to protect the system from the adverse effect of such open
door policy on the licensing of new banks, the minimum paid-up capital of commercial banks
was increased from NlO million to N20 million and that for merchant banks, from N6 millio~
to· N12 million. Recently, these capital requirements were again raised to NSO million for
commercial banks and N40 million for merchant banks, the rational being to ensure a sound
capital base for effective and competitive banking operations in the light of the sharp
depreciation in the exchange value of the naira. Towards the end of 1990, a set of prudential
guidelines and accounting standards for licensed banks were also introduced which are
essentially complementary to the capital adequacy rules. These recent actions of the monetary
authorities would suggest that deregulation is not absolute but needs to be supported by
reasonable rules which will ensure th~ stability of the. system.
The period of deregulation has also witnessed a number of strategic institutional changes
in the banking system in Nigeria designed to prepare the industry of further deregulation.
Among these changes was the take-off of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC)
charged with the responsibility of insuring bank deposits against bank failures and el1$uring
safe and sound banking practices through effective monitoring and supervision of the banks,
in collaboration with the CBN. Given the fear being expressed about th~proliferation of banks
and the possibility of bank failure as the system has become more competitive, the establishment of the NDIC is intended to instill greater confidence in the banking system.
Another notable action which has placed the b;mks at gtelltet alert in i ~riod of·
deregulation was the withdrawal of public sector deposits from the banking system which has
had the effect of separating banks from such public sector funds which had been known to
discourage healthy competition in savings mobilization. Another was the introduction of the
use of an auction-based system for the issuing of treasury securities whose principal objectives
are the promotion of greater reliance on market forces in the determination of yields on
government debt instruments through market-determined interest rates and efficient management of public debt. Since September 1989, banks have also been directed to adopt uniform
definitions in reporting some transactions which were treated differently hitherto.
It is instructive to add that the process of deregulation is ultimately expected to culminate
in the adoption of the indirect-techniques of monetary management which use market-oriented
instruments of monetary and credit control. These would involve the use of cash reserve/liquidity ratio requirements; and open market operations instead of credit ceilings to target the
desirable level of money supply and credit that would guarantee stable, non-inflationary
economic growth. The monetary and credit policy measures outlined in the 1991 Budget made
a modest start towards implementing this monetary control system by defining a more effective
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cash reserve requirement of all banks. With a view to targeting broad money, the CBN
redefined the cash reserve requirement on the basic of all deposit liabilities of the banks. The
Bank continued its policy to put all institutions in the system on e·qual footing in its policy
framework. The issue of stabilization securities for mopping excess liquidity in the system has
assumed some significance and it is envisaged that more market-based CBN securities would
emerge in the ~ture. Apart from the monetary and banking reforms described above, the
operations of th~ official foreign exchange market has been radically modified since 1986. The
adoption of a floating exchange rate system in which the price mechanism allocates foreign
exchange am·ong competing uses has bad the effect of reducing if not, eliminating the pains
previously experienced by the banks in administering foreign exchange policies under the
Exchange Control Act 1962. To complement _this strategy, external trade activities have been
substantially liberalised which has further simplified the process of international trade transactions through the banking system.
Effects of Deregulation
At present, the full impact of deregulation on the banking industry can hardly be sufficiently
evaluated since most of the expected effects can only be fully apparent. in the medium to
long-term. Besides, _the financial ~ystem is still subject to some fundamental direct controls
which will likely obscure for sometime the effects of the reforms already undertaken. In a more
rigorous impact analysis, some important elements such as the level and structure of interest
rates, growth of the banking sector, competitiveness and efficiency of the system, the quality
of banks' loan portfolios and the system's integration with the international banking system
would need to ,be evaluated, which is not possible at the moment. Our review will therefore be
rather general and preliminary in nature. In the last five years, some position developments
have been observed in the industry which may be directly or indirectly attributed to the
deregulation undertaken so far. At the same time, some aspects of deregulation have resulted
in unintended, negative side effects.
(a)

Positive Effects

There is ample evidenJ;e that the deregulation <?f interest rates has engendered very keen
competition in the banking industry, resulting in the adoption of new strategies by banks to
attract deposits and encourage savings. As a result, total fmancial saving have risen from Nll.5
billion in 1986 to ~27.9 billion. at the end of 1990. However, the rapid and significant shifts in
interest rates observed during the period were of serious concern to the monetary authorities
because such high rates could retard productive investments and growth. This led to the slight
modification in the policy from total deregulation of interest rates to the present transitory
requirement of requesting banks to justify their interest rates by reference to their actual cost
of funds. The monetary authorities were compelled to take this step as a cursory observation
would show that financial costs could no longer be regarded as an insignificant proportion of
total production costs. Thi; effect of high interest rates on domestic output could be negative
especially when considered in relation to the cost increases already generated by the measures
of trade and exchange rate liberalisation. Also, the authorities felt that the prevailing interest
rate levels before the recent guidelines were out of equilibrium. Some of the indications were
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the rapid decline in the inflation rate and growth in domestic liquidity, as well as the
imperfections in the money markets which have encouraged inefficient pricing. It was consequently felt that interest rate management could be productive pending further reforms in the
banking system.
·
Also, in the area of credit policy and portfolio selection, a new sense of rationality has
emerged following the gradual deregulation of the policy of sectoral aYocation. Ease of access
to credit has been widely observed, even though a few banks still default in lending to the
preferred sectors. Many entrepreneurs are, however, diversifying their sources of credit away
from formal financial institutions to the capital market where the opportunity cost of capital
is relatively low. Financial liberalization has also brought about unprecedented growth in the
nµmber of banks operating in Nigeria, especially since 1986. The trend is that many more banb
are likely to come into the scene, in spite of the increase in paid-up capital requirements. This
is likely to ensure even keener competition· in the industry, through the emergence of new
financial products in the money market.
(b)

Some Associated Problems

In spite of the improvements highlighted above, the banking sector is still be set with a
number of problems, although these have not been due solely to but probably accentuated by
the process of deregulation.· Prominent among th_ese are poor management, increase in
fraudulent practices, inadequate infrastructure and scarcity of professional staff. The problem
of dearth of managerial staff has manifested in frequent turnover of bank executives, frauds,
forgeries, litigations, weak internal controls and contravention of statutory banking regulations. Large scale frauds in the system also derive from the predominance of banking of
banking documents most of which could easily be forged. It is also pertinent to state here that
banking services are still relatively inefficient. The expectation that the increase in the number
of banks would result in a significant improvement in the qqality of bank services has
unfortunately not materialized. Rather, the general impression appears to be that, even though
the so-called era of "armchair" banking has gone, ths: quality of banking service in terms of
the promptness of the services and courteousness to customers has not improved appreciably.
One factor which is largely responsible for long delays in the provision of banking services is
the unduly voluminous documentation which· customers have to deal with before simple
transactions are effected. This is partly because many banks are yet to get involved with the
computer technology and partly because the momentum of change has not be~n thoroughly
appreciated by many of the banks. It is expected, however, that as deregulation progresses
further, the documentation problem will be moderated. Lastly, there is the question of whether
the country is now over-banked. Many have argued that, in spite of the sharp increase in the
number of banks and bank branches, the bank density per population has been stagnant if not
declining, given the high rate of population growth. There is also the fact that most of these
banks and their branches are located in urban centers, while the rural areas are still grossly
starved of banking service.
I
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PARTIV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has reviewed the various measures of deregulation in the Nigerian banking
industry against the background of the excessive regulations which characterized the industry
in the last four decades. It was clear that banking regulations during the early evolution of the
industry in Nigeria served some useful purpose, especially in ensuring the viability and stability
of the industry. However, with prolonged use of some regulations, a number of negative effects
emerged prominent among which was the loss of competitiveuess am:! therefore efficiency in
the banking industry. Furthernmre, excessive regulations led the banks to adopt various
methods to circumvent the direct credit controls by window-dressing. statutory returns to the
monetary authorities, practicef which severely lowered the impact of the banking system while
taxing the resources and effort:-, of the Central Bank iu trying to monitor compliance with the
various regulations. Perhaps, the most serious shortcoming of the banking industry under the
spell of regulations was the tendency towards the promot~on of a sub-optimal pricing and
allocation system of financial resources resulting in dtsincentives the savings and inadequate
resources for investment.
On the other hand, deregulation of the banking industry has encouraged savings mobilization and improved a~cess to bank ·loans. Available evidence has shown that financial intermediation has improved significantly since deregulation started about five year ago.
Deregulation has also brought about a significant increase in the number of banks operating
in Nigeria. There is consequently keener competition in the industry, resulting in the emergence of a range of new products. Indeed, as it is now widely acclaimed, the era of "armchair"
banking is gone. There are of course a number of problems which have emerged or accentuated with the deregulation. ·Among these are the high cost of bank lending with its attendant
adverse impact on domestic investments and the general business climate. There is a consensus
too that the quality of banking services has not improved to the extent anticipated, while
fraudulent practices in the industry have escalated. On balance, however, there is no gainsaying
the fact that the advantages of deregulation have so far out-weighed the negative effects, given
the background of the economic problems which led to the adoption of SAP. And as with SAP
itself, there is hardly a more viable alternative strategy to the on-going process of deregulation
in the banking industry for structural growth and development of the Nigerian economy.
Certainly, the transition from intensive banking regulation in Nigeria has been highly
demanding. One must hasten to add that the efforts so far made to deregulate the banking
industry have mainly served to clear the ground for a fuller deregulation. As we are all aware,
the final stages in the process of deregulation of the banking system would involve the use of
indirect instruments of monetary and credit control which relies on market-base instruments
such as the cash reserve. and liquidity ratio requirements ~nd open market operations to
regulate the monetary base and therefore the banks' money creation capability. Although it
has its limitations, this system of monetary management has overwhelming advantages. The
instruments involved are easy to administer and flexible. Moreover, they do not interfere with
competition amorig banks, while they ·encourage greater efficiency in the use of funds.
However, the successful manipulation of these instruments required prompt availability of
reliable date on the liquidity position of banks. Banks would therefore render returns to the
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monetary authorities more efficiently than at present. The performance of banks with regard
to efficient rendition of returns to the CBN has been very poor which limits the ability of the
Bank to effectively monitor monetary and credit developments. This is neither in the interest
of the industry nor of the economy as a whole. The use of mar~et- based instnmients of
monetary and credit control is also incompatible with the existence of insolvent banks. Such
banks must improve their performance in order to survive under the new control system. The
monetary authorities would still need to make regulations to ensure the stability of the system.
This is likely to take the form of prescribing new financial reporting standards, and prudential
guidelines which have already been introduced, for all banks and even non-bank financial
institutions. This underscores the desirability of strengthening the monitoring and supervisory
powers of the monetary authorities in order to ensure that the deregulation of the banking
industry does not lead to anarchy. Consequently, banks should be aware that full banking
deregulation would involve some regulations initially. However, these regulations only help to
strengthen the infrastructural base of the system and once they are implemented they need
not subject the operations of the banks to the instability observed in the past. The application
of the regulations demands maximum cooperation between the banks and the monetary
authorities.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that deregulation of the banking industry would in fact
impose more responsibilities on bank executives than hitherto. Bank executives must continue
to be effective and innovative in the way they manage the affairs of their banks if they must
stay in business. Besides, bank officials must now see themselves as being jointly responsible
for any illegal activities involving their banks. Furthermore, one would expect that, since the
effective use of instruments of indirect monetary and credit control would require prompt
supply of reliable data from banks, bank executives must ensure that the accounts of their
banks are balanced promptly. This would call for a comprehensive computerization
programme of banking operations if such statutory returns are to be made as required. Finally,
it is necessary to emphasize the importance of a comprehensive training scheme for all cadres
of bank staff in different aspects of the knowledge ,and skills involved in effective banking
operations under the regime of deregulation.
In conclusion, it needs to be restated that the health of an economy depends on its ability
to generate growth, ensure price stability, boost employment and enhance equitable distribution of income in the medium to long-term. It is against this criterion that the success of
Nigeria's experiment with economic deregulation must inevitably be assessed. We have the
firm view that the pace of attaining a self-sustained growth and stability is enhanced in an
environment which is devoid of inhibiting bureaucracy and where private initiative and
creativity through unfettered and dynamic entrepreneurship is enthroned. Owing to the
pivotal role of a viable banking system in the development of the economy, bank executives
must see themselves as having a unique opportunity in helping to shape the direction of the
Nigerian economy. While it is legitimate for bank executives to want to derive maximum
short-run benefits from the system, it should be recognised that it is only when the economy
e"--periences a genuine and lasting transformation that such benefits can be sustained. It is
therefore of utmost importance for b,mb and their ext:cuti\'es to rc~ard themselves as part of
a whole that is in dire need of tangihle progress.
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